



Earnings Management in Domestic and Foreign IPOs in the United States: Do 





King’s Business School 
King's College London 
Bush House 
30 Aldwych 
London WC2B 4BG, UK 
Email: Igor.Filatotchev@kcl.ac.uk 
and 
Vienna University of Economics and Business 
 
Jonathan Jona*  
Faculty of Business and Economics 
The University of Melbourne 
198 Berkeley St.  





University of Exeter Business School 
Streatham Court, Rennes Drive 






* Corresponding author. We thank two anonymous reviewers and Thomas Jean-Jean (the Editor), 
Dan Amiram, Mary Barth, Michael Dambra, Katerina Hellstrom, Amir Licht, Angela Pettinicchio, 
Matthew Pinnuck, Giulia Redigolo, Jay Ritter, Naomi Soderstrom, and Anne Wyatt. We also thank 
seminar participants at the BEROC Conference Minsk 2012, EAA Annual Meeting 2013, AAA 
Annual Meetings 2013 and 2015, Bocconi University, Cass Business School, ESSEC Paris, 
Griffith University, New Economic School, Oulu University, Stockholm School of Economics, 
Tsinghua University, University of Edinburgh Business School, University of Melbourne, 
University of New South Wales, University of Padua, University of Queensland, University of 
Southampton, University Technology Sydney, and Warwick Business School for their helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
 
 
Earnings Management in Domestic and Foreign IPOs in the United States: Do 




Using a large sample of domestic and foreign IPOs in the US, we investigate how threats of 
enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and private litigation influence 
earnings management in IPO prospectuses. We propose that perceptions of foreign institutions 
may influence SEC enforcement action and private litigation. We provide evidence that 
enforcement and litigation threats are negatively related to the strength of legal institutions in the 
foreign IPO’s country of origin. We find earnings management is more pronounced in foreign 
IPOs from countries with strong legal institutions. We further explore whether earnings 
management is priced in the IPO market and find no relation between IPO proceeds and earnings 
management. Our results are consistent with upward earnings management as in Stein (1989), the 
magnitude of which is reduced when the anticipated cost of enforcement and litigation is higher. 
Collectively, our results cast doubt on the validity of the bonding hypothesis. 
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Earnings Management in Domestic and Foreign IPOs in the United States:  
Do Home Country Institutions Matter? 
 
1. Introduction  
Earnings management has attracted significant attention in prior research, as managers can use 
earnings to opportunistically influence various corporate outcomes such as security prices, debt 
contracts, and personal compensation. This research has mainly focused on corporate governance 
mechanisms that could mitigate the adverse effects associated with opportunistic earnings 
management, but has produced ambiguous results (Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007). However, 
the incidence and magnitude of earnings management is not only a function of firm-specific 
corporate governance mechanisms, it also reflects a firm’s exposure to external, macro-
institutional forces such as investor protection, enforcement risk, private litigation, and investor 
beliefs.  
Securities laws offer a varying degree of investor protection across countries (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). Such variety has been linked to differences in the extent of 
earnings management at the country-level, with the extent being higher in institutional 
environments with weaker investor protection (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Bushman, Piotroski, 
& Smith, 2004; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Moreover, the “bonding” hypothesis (Coffee, 
1999; Stulz, 1999) posits that foreign firms can circumvent the effects of a weak corporate 
governance regime in their home countries through a commitment to better governance 
mechanisms by listing in countries with stronger legal institutions, such as the US. Arguably, 
bonding works insofar as it is backed by a credible threat of enforcement and litigation. However, 
bonding is less likely to work where foreign firms do not anticipate close scrutiny with associated 
adverse consequences. As we subsequently explain, it is plausible such threats are shaped by the 
perceptions of the legal institutions of the foreign firm’s country of origin. These perceptions are 
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particularly salient in the US IPO market, because foreign IPOs are relatively unknown entities 
when entering US capital markets. In this paper we therefore examine the relation between 
earnings management in foreign IPOs and home institutions.  
Prior research has not investigated whether foreign IPOs manage earnings at a similar level as 
domestic US IPOs, as the bonding hypothesis suggests. Most studies investigating the bonding 
hypothesis have used samples comprised primarily of cross-listed firms (i.e., firms with listings in 
both their home country and in the US) and report mixed results.1 However, the strength of bonding 
in cross-listed firms may differ substantially from that of IPOs for several reasons. First, cross-
listed firms are typically more mature and, as such firms have been listed in the US for several 
years, they are better known to US investors. Being relatively unknown, IPO managers can exploit 
their information advantage by managing earnings more aggressively than mature firms. Second, 
cross-listed firms need to satisfy several sets of national securities regulations, which may 
compromise bonding to US rules. Third, while the IPO market may present stronger incentives to 
manipulate earnings than in the secondary market (Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998), it is also 
characterized by a higher level of investor and regulatory scrutiny (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; 
Ndubizu, 2007). However, prior literature has not examined if such scrutiny is equally applied to 
IPOs regardless of their country of origin.  
Earnings management may vary in IPOs according to country of origin even though they 
exclusively list in the US. First, if the IPO’s main activities remain located in its home country, 
relevant laws still likely govern a broad range of contracts in that country (e.g., compensation, 
CEO dismissals, borrowing and entering liquidation procedures). Extant research has shown that 
such contracts may motivate earnings management.2 Second, perceptions by US investors and 
                                                 
1 See Karolyi (2012) for a review of the evidence on the bonding hypothesis.  
2 Our paper, however, does not provide evidence pertaining to the importance of contracting in an IPO’s home country. 
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government officials of foreign institutions likely play an important role. These parties may be 
suspicious of foreign firms—and foreign IPOs in particular—because of a lack of familiarity 
(Merton, 1987) and perceptions of institutional and cultural distance.3 Bearing in mind that the 
SEC’s monitoring and enforcement resources are costly and limited (e.g., Correia, 2014; Kedia 
and Rajgopal, 2011), we argue that SEC is vulnerable to adverse political consequences of 
accounting irregularities (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). We further posit that these consequences 
are more pronounced in the case of US domestic IPOs, because they are primarily owned by US 
investors. Thus, the SEC directs more enforcement resources to US domestic IPOs. Among foreign 
IPOs, the SEC is more likely to monitor and initiate disciplinary actions against—and investors 
may be more inclined to sue—those IPOs they perceive to have poor corporate governance based 
on country of origin (Gu, Filatotchev, Bell, & Rasheed, 2018). Expecting this, foreign IPOs from 
countries with weak institutions would manage earnings to a lesser extent than IPOs from countries 
with strong institutions. 
In our first set of analysis, we provide evidence supporting the conjecture that SEC enforcement 
and private litigation are directed relatively more at firms originating from countries with weak 
institutions. We then present evidence that earnings management is inversely related to the 
enforcement and litigation threats. In the second set of analysis, we explore the relation between 
home country institutions and earnings management. We find foreign IPOs from countries with 
strong institutions inflate earnings more than both domestic US IPOs and other foreign IPOs.  
Our final analysis examines the pricing implications of earnings management. Because IPO 
firms raise cash, it is possible that the objective of earnings management is to inflate earnings to 
increase proceeds (Teoh et al., 1998; Teoh and Wong, 2002). This suggests a positive relation 
                                                 
3 We elaborate on the role of perceptions in Section 2.3. 
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between earnings management and IPO proceeds. On the other hand, Shivakumar (2000), building 
on Stein (1989), argued that since investors expect earnings management, the best response for 
managers is to increase earnings. In equilibrium, managers are “trapped” into managing earnings 
upward, but investors rationally discount earnings management. Consistent with this, we find no 
relation between earnings management and IPO proceeds.  
 We contribute to the IPO literature in five ways. First, Lang, Raedy, &  Wilson (2006) explored 
earnings quality in mature foreign firms listed in the US and found evidence suggestive of poorer 
earnings quality in cross-listed firms from countries with weak institutions. We show that in the 
IPO market, earnings management is more pronounced in IPOs from countries with strong 
institutions. Second, our results are relevant for assessing the strength of the bonding theory. Our 
evidence stands in contrast to the conclusions of several prior papers arguing that bonding works. 
Moreover, we provide evidence consistent with a link between SEC enforcement, or private 
litigation, and home institutions. This link is indicative of the role of perceptions when information 
asymmetry is high. Third, we add further evidence on how the SEC prioritizes its limited resources 
(e.g., Correia, 2014; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011) and extend this line of research to the IPO market. 
Fourth, our evidence further supports the notion that reputational concerns may generate bonding 
(Siegel, 2005). In particular, IPOs from weak-institution countries use less-aggressive accounting, 
as would be expected from a motivation to build reputational capital. Finally, we extend 
Sivakumar’s (2000) results obtained for seasoned equity offerings to the foreign IPO market by 






2. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development  
2.1 IPO Earnings Management  
 
Earnings management may be difficult to detect in IPOs because new firms are less known to 
market participants. Teoh and Wong (2002) provided evidence that analysts are insufficiently 
skeptical regarding IPO accruals management, whereas this is not the case for mature firms. This 
lack of familiarity may be more pronounced for foreign IPOs owing to the distance of their main 
operations from capital markets and US investors (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Malloy, 2005) 
and, more generally, owing to their foreignness.  
Insofar as information asymmetry and lack of familiarity allow for more earnings management, 
earnings may be inflated by IPO owners seeking to maintain control and personal benefits (Leuz, 
et al., 2003). The evidence on earnings management in IPOs is, however, mixed. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) posited that pre-IPO accruals should be used to capture earnings management 
to influence IPO outcomes, implying measures of post-IPO accruals used by Teoh et al. (1998) are 
contaminated by the effect of IPO proceeds on abnormal accruals. Ball and Shivakumar (2008, p. 
324) showed that pre-IPOs earnings are more conservative than mature firms’ earnings and 
attribute this finding to “higher monitoring by auditors, boards, analysts, rating agencies, press, 
and litigants, and to greater regulatory scrutiny.” A similar result is reported in Venkataraman, 
Weber, &  Willenborg (2008), who attributed it to the 1933 Securities Act. This Act governs IPOs 
and provides investors with better legal protection than the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which 
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applies to the secondary market.4 In contrast, Aharony, Lin, &  Loeb (1993) did not find evidence 
of either earnings inflation or deflation in pre-IPO financials.5 
2.2 Bonding to US Institutions 
Foreign firms may decide to list in the US for several reasons including benefiting from highly 
liquid markets, a broader investor base, cheaper finance, and greater product and corporate 
visibility (Licht, 2003). Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) argued that a different set of benefits—
related to corporate governance—plays an important role in the listing decision. Specifically, by 
listing in the US, foreign firms “rent” what many regard (but not all agree upon) to be the strongest 
global set of legal, enforcement, and disclosure mechanisms. As such, “renting” legal institutions 
helps these firms to credibly mitigate agency conflicts otherwise unavoidable in their home 
countries. However, as Coffee (2002) acknowledged, in the case of cross-listing (i.e., firms with 
US as well as home listings), foreign firms must also meet home-country rules and cannot 
exclusively obey US rules. He further argues that in order to completely escape home jurisdiction, 
a foreign firm should adopt an IPO route. Prior literature is silent on whether this conjecture is 
supported empirically. Amir, Harris, &  Venuti (1993) and Lang et al. (2006) provided evidence 
on earnings management consistent with mature cross-listed firms not fully bonding with US 
reporting standards. Silvers (2016) examined SEC enforcement actions against foreign firms listed 
in the US and found positive market reaction to such enforcement actions in mature foreign firms 
not targeted by the SEC. Silvers (2016) interpreted this result as supporting bonding; however, the 
                                                 
4 Perhaps the most relevant section of the 1933 Act is Section 11. It stipulates that damages can arise when an investor 
relies on a prospectus and the award to the successful plaintiff is larger when the difference between the offer price 
and the sell price is greater, or the price at the time of the lawsuit. Lowry and Shu (2002) found the incidence of 
litigation against IPOs stands at about 6% and that most of the suits were brought under this section. 
5 Ndubizu (2007) found foreign IPOs manage earnings more than mature US firms. Lee and Masulis (2011) found 
IPOs select underwriters to reduce information asymmetry, which, in turn, reduces earnings management. However, 




cause of this effect may be due to lower expected litigation costs in non-target firms because the 
SEC has constrained resources (as we discuss below).  
A number of legal scholars have challenged the bonding theory and its underlying assumptions. 
Licht (2000, 2003) argued the legal remedies available to shareholders of US-listed foreign firms 
are markedly weaker than those available to shareholders of domestic US firms. Moreover, for 
foreign firms, the SEC “cuts corners” on issues of corporate governance, evidence of which can 
be found in official pronouncements (e.g., NYSE, 2013).6 Shnitser (2010, p. 1644) further stated 
that “foreign issuers face minimal litigation exposure when cross-listing in the US.” Cheng, 
Srinivasan, & Yu (2014) showed the incidence of class action lawsuits against cross-listed firms 
is significantly lower than against US firms. Similar to Fanto (1996) and Siegel (2005), they 
posited that this is caused by greater challenges in obtaining relevant information from foreign 
firms in regard to litigation.  
While the bonding hypothesis highlights the role of legal and enforcement mechanisms, several 
papers point to the possibility that commitment to high-quality reporting may take place even in 
the absence of formal rules or powerful regulators. Gomes (2000) explored a model in which 
insiders commit not to expropriate minority shareholders in order to establish a reputation for 
“good behavior.” Insiders benefit from this strategy because it helps them obtain the highest price 
when selling their shares following the IPO. This literature implies that more conservative 
reporting can convey a commitment not to use earnings management to mask expropriation of 
minority shareholders.  
It is well-known that the SEC has faced significant budget constraints (Cox, Thomas, & Kiku, 
2003; Stewart, 2011). Prior research suggests that SEC enforcement would first target US domestic 
                                                 
6 This regulatory “lighter touch” is likely motivated by the desire to attract foreign listings to the US. 
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firms, because of their proximity and cost-saving implications (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2011), as well 
as non-politically connected firms (Correia, 2014). Private investors may also find it is simpler to 
sue US managers because of the difficulties in dealing with firms headquartered in non-US 
jurisdictions (Cheng, et al., 2014).7 In addition, with a home bias in investment decisions (Coval 
and Moskowitz, 1999), the SEC may face political and media pressure if it fails to discipline US 
domestic IPOs first and foremost (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006), and then discipline foreign firms 
that are more adversely perceived by investors and the public.  
To the extent that domestic US IPOs attract more scrutiny, foreign IPOs in the US anticipate 
lower enforcement and litigation threats than domestic US IPOs. We therefore expect the level of 
earnings management in US-based foreign IPOs to exceed that of domestic IPOs. Our first 
hypothesis, in null form, is as follows:  
H1: Foreign firms with IPOs in the US market manage earnings to a greater extent than 
US firms with IPOs in the US market. 
2.3 Perceptions of Home Institutions 
Prior research has established that history and culture shape a country’s institutions (Greif, 
1994), resulting in cross-country institutional differences. Institutional theorists have emphasized 
the importance of perceptions of economic actors in various institutional contexts (Scott, 1995). 
For example, investor perceptions of investment risk have been linked to the effect of  institutional 
characteristics of the country of origin on the listing choice (Moore, Bell, Filatotchev, & Rasheed, 
2012; Sarkissian and Schill, 2003). For investors, geographical and cultural proximity appear to 
drive decisions in which firms to invest, whereby investors exhibit a home bias, as they prefer local 
firms over foreign firms (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). The home 
                                                 
7 Consistent with this, Cheng et al. (2014) reported that foreign firms are sued at a rate of 2.16% whereas in a sample 
of matched US firms the rate is 4.10%. 
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bias literature has also suggested that perceptions of foreign firms are shaped by institutional and 
cultural distance (Anderson, Fedenia, Hirschey, & Skiba, 2011).  
The international business literature has termed this “aversion” to foreign firms as the liability 
of foreignness (e.g., Zaheer, 1995). Specifically, Zaheer (1995, p. 343) defined this liability as “all 
additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur.”8 
Nahata, Hazarika, & Tandon (2014) argued that differences in institutions can be a major source 
of conflict between company insiders and outsiders, making it more costly for a foreign firm to 
attract investment. More specifically, in many cases, the IPO firm’s operations remain in the home 
country, and disputes between shareholders and other stakeholders may need to be resolved outside 
the US, which complicates conflict resolution for US investors and increases the cost of capital for 
a foreign firm (Nahata, et al., 2014).  
Institutional similarity also shapes trust, which in turn influences investors’ actions in stock 
markets owing to a perception of investment risk (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008, 2009). Prior 
research has argued a firm’s home institutions matter in that economic agents in the host country 
are more suspicious of foreign firms from farther institutional distances (Anderson, et al., 2011; 
Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Consistent with these arguments, emerging research in management and 
international business has presented evidence of a valuation effect of investors’ perception of a 
foreign IPO’s home country institutions (e.g., Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014; Gu et al., 2018).  
Our second hypothesis therefore concerns how earnings management varies with home country 
institutions. We argue that perceptions form a channel through which home institutions can shape 
IPO earnings management. IPOs originating from weak-institution countries expect to be 
                                                 
8 Research in accounting has largely overlooked the role of perceptions in the IPO market. An exception to this is a 
recent study by Blankespoor, Hendricks, &  Miller (2017) that used an experimental research design to investigate the 
effect of perceptions on IPO pricing. 
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scrutinized more by US investors and regulators9 and thus manage earnings to a lesser extent. In 
contrast, managers of IPOs originating from countries with strong home institutions face a smaller 
incentive to constrain earnings management. Our second hypothesis therefore is:  
H2: Earnings management is higher in IPOs originating from countries with strong legal 
institutions than in IPOs originating from countries with weak legal institutions. 
3. Research Design and Sample 
3.1 Measuring Abnormal Accruals in IPOs 
Our measure of discretionary accruals uses financial data from IPO prospectuses and is based 
on Ball and Shivakumar (2008) for a number of reasons. First, the information in a prospectus is 
subject to more intense scrutiny by, for example, the SEC,10 underwriters, and in particular, 
auditors (Venkataraman, et al., 2008). Second, in an IPO context, reporting choices could be 
directed at influencing the amount of cash proceeds insiders hope to raise, or the subsequent market 
price. Post-IPO earnings obviously cannot be used for this purpose. Finally, using pre-IPO 
abnormal accruals is also warranted from a more technical perspective, as post-IPO accruals are 
likely affected by use of the IPO’s cash proceeds. Therefore, post-IPO accruals are a contaminated 
measure of strategic earnings management exercised by insiders prior to the IPO. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) modified the Jones (1991) model to account for conservatism in 
accruals. In the IPO context, measuring abnormal accruals from such a model is motivated by the 
view that IPOs report more conservatively than mature firms. Moreover, Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) argued against the use of the original Jones (1991) model in IPOs, because it results in an 
unusually high measure of abnormal accruals. The modification adopted by Ball and Shivakumar 
                                                 
9 We provide evidence on the threat of litigation and enforcement in Table 4. 
10 Although the SEC vets IPO documents prior to listing, the SEC audits financial statements only periodically 
following an IPO. 
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(2008) allows negative cash flows to be incorporated into accruals at a different speed than positive 
cash flows. This approach measures normal accruals as the predicted value of regression line 
(omitting the time index t and individual IPO index i in all equations): 
 ,         (1) 
where accruals (ACC) is net income before extraordinary items, plus depreciation and amortization 
minus operating cash flows. ∆Rev is the change between year t and year t-1 in net sales. This model 
employs the net book value of property, plants, and equipment, FASSET, and operating cash flow, 
CFO. All aforementioned variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. DCFO 
takes the value 1 if CFO < 0 and 0 otherwise. We winsorize the top and bottom 1% of each 
continuous explanatory variable.11  
We estimate Model 1 in two ways. First, to provide descriptive statistics regarding greater 
reporting conservatism in IPOs, comparable to Ball and Shivakumar (2008), we measure abnormal 
accruals in the IPO sample relative to mature US-listed firms. Specifically, based on the entire 
COMPUSTAT population, but excluding IPOs, we run Model 1 on an industry-year basis and use 
the regression coefficients to calculate the abnormal accrual variable (ABNACC) for all sample 
IPOs as follows:  
 .           
(2) 
Second, because our main focus is on the IPO market, we run Model 1 in the main analyses for 
only the IPO sample and use the resultant coefficients in Model 2.12  
                                                 
11 We apply a similar procedure throughout the paper. 
12 Due to the limited sample size, and in line with Peek, Meuwissen, Moers, &  Vanstraelen (2013), we combine 
several years for each industry. Specifically, we use three consecutive years as a single period, as follows: 1990–1994, 
1995–1998, 1999–2001, 2002–2005, and 2006–2009. Model 1 is estimated to require at least ten observations.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 *ACC Rev FASSET CFO DCFO DCFO CFOβ β β β β β ε= + ∆ + + + + +
1 2 3 4 5 6




3.2 Measuring the Strength of Home Institutions 
 
The strength of an IPO’s home institutions is captured by the variable INST. This variable is 
based on the classification of legal institutions provided by Leuz (2010). Specifically, in Panel C 
of Table 3, Leuz (2010) assigns national legal institutions into three clusters based on their 
variables of regulatory and reporting practices. Countries in the first cluster are regarded as having 
the strongest institutions. We therefore set INST = 1 if an IPO comes from this cluster and zero 
otherwise. 
3.3 Regression Models and Variables 
Our first objective is to examine how the threats of SEC enforcement and private litigation vary 
between foreign and domestic US IPOs. We also want to examine, within the foreign IPOs 
subsample, the link between the threats of SEC enforcement, private litigation, and INST, 
controlling for some other country-specific variables. However, as we subsequently explain, while 
we have data on private litigation for both US and foreign firms, we do not have data on SEC 
enforcement for the US. We use a parsimonious model for each threat, as follows: 
          (3a) 
 .        (3b) 
          
We run Model 3a using the foreign sample only. The dependent variable—our proxy for the 
threat of SEC enforcement of foreign firms (SEC_ENF)—is the percentage of firm-year 
observations with SEC enforcement reported in Table 2 in Silvers (2016) per-foreign country 
1 2 3_ _SEC ENF INST AGG EM GDPα β β β ε= + + + +
1 2 3/ _PLIT FOREIGN INST AGG EM GDPα β β β ε= + + + +
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sample.13 In Model 3b the dependent variable—our proxy for private litigation (PLIT)—is the 
percentage of firm-years with securities class actions reported in Table 3 in Cheng et al. (2014).14 
INST features in both models when we use the foreign IPOs subsample. In addition, we run Model 
3b on the entire sample while replacing INST with FOREIGN. When using the foreign IPOs 
sample, finding that β1 is negative is consistent with the view that perceptions of stronger home 
institutions are associated with fewer enforcement actions and reduced private litigation. When we 
run Model 3b on the entire sample, finding that β1 is negative implies that the threat of private 
litigation is lower for foreign IPOs than domestic US IPOs. Both models feature the same control 
variables, which may shape the enforcement and private litigation threats. The first variable is the 
country-level aggregated earnings management measure (AGG_EM), as calculated by Boulton, 
Smart, & Zutter (2011). The second variable is the IPO’s home country’s GDP in the year the IPO 
takes place.  
In analyzing the association between abnormal accruals, ABNACC, and an IPO’s foreign status 
and home institutions in the IPO sample, we employ the following model: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
,
ABNACC THREAT LITIG AUD SOX LTA LPROC
                 HiTECH LEV LSALES CFO LROA
                 Industry Year
α β β β β β β
β β β β β
ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + +∑ ∑
          (4) 
where THREAT is either SEC_ENF or PLIT. We expect a negative relation between ABNACC and 
THREAT to the extent that a great risk of enforcement and litigation constrains earnings 
management. 
                                                 
13 Silvers (2016) did not report a measure of enforcement of US firms. Hence, we run Model 3a on the foreign IPOs 
subsample. In using Silvers’ (2016) Table 2, we implicitly assume that SEC enforcement of mature foreign firms is 
similar to its enforcement of foreign IPOs. If this assumption is violated, then SEC_ENF is measured with noise and 
we are less likely to establish significant relations.   
14 We also assume that private litigations rates reported in Cheng et al. (2014) of mature firms are similar for IPOs.  
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To test the direct effect of foreignness, we define an indictor variable, FOREIGN, which is set 
equal to 1 if the IPO is a foreign IPO, and zero otherwise. We then run the following model in the 
full sample, which includes both US IPOs and foreign IPOs: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
/
,
ABNACC FOREIGN INST LITIG AUD SOX LTA LPROC
                 HiTECH LEV LSALES CFO LROA
                 Industry Year
α β β β β β β
β β β β β
ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + +∑ ∑
 (5) 
We also test how earnings management varies with home institutions across foreign IPOs by 
using Model 5 after replacing FOREIGN with INST. Our main coefficient of interest is β1, the 
coefficient on FOREIGN (or, INST). When FOREIGN is used in Model 5, this coefficient captures 
the incremental level of abnormal accruals in foreign IPOs over that of domestic IPOs. When using 
INST within the subsample of foreign IPOs, this coefficient captures the incremental level of 
abnormal accruals in foreign IPOs originating from strong-institution countries over that of foreign 
IPOs from weak-institution countries. 
Models 4 and 5 include several common control variables that are organized in three groups: 
variables capturing other sources of scrutiny, variables capturing incentives to inflate earnings, and 
other control variables. The first set of control variables includes LITIG, an industry-based 
indicator for litigation risk consistent with Frankel, Johnson, &  Nelson (2002) and Ashbaugh, 
LaFond, &  Mayhew (2003).15 We control for auditor size, as monitoring by large auditors is 
stronger than by small auditors (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Fan and Wong, 2005; Venkataraman, 
et al., 2008). Specifically, AUD is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the auditing firm is 
a Big-6, Big-5 or Big-4 in 1990–1997, 1998–2001, and 2002 onwards, respectively, and 0 
otherwise. SOX is an indicator variable that is set equal 1 if the IPO occurred after enactment of 
                                                 
15 The industries that are more prone to US litigation are identified in Francis, Philbrick, &  Schipper (1994).  
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002, and 0 otherwise. Following Cohen, Dey, &  Lys 
(2008), SOX controls for the possibility that a stricter regulatory environment following SOX 
influenced earnings management in IPOs. Because larger IPO firms may be subject to greater 
public attention, we include LTA, the log of total assets. The expected sign of the coefficients 
included in this group is negative. 
The second group of control variables includes proxies for incentives to inflate earnings. First, 
we control for the possibility of earnings management that aims to influence the IPO proceeds. 
Specifically, we employ the variable LPROC, which is the log of actual proceeds.16 Notably, 
proceeds also act as a measure of the IPO’s importance and size. Many IPOs come from the high-
tech sector. Since such firms may be harder to understand owing to a high level of intangibles 
(Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 2001), managers may have a greater incentive to inflate earnings, 
because high R&D expenses depress reported earnings. We therefore include an indicator variable 
HiTECH for technology firms, as defined by Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum and 
Thomson Reuters. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the IPO and controls for the possibility that leverage affects earnings management. The 
expected sign of the coefficients included in this group is positive.  
The third group of control variables includes additional firm fundamentals. Although IPO firms 
are relatively young, an IPO may occur at different stages of the product life cycle, which may 
influence reporting choices. Assuming life cycle is reflected in recorded sales, we include LSALES, 
the log of sales at the end of the fiscal year preceding the IPO, which is also commonly used as a 
measure of risk (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Lagged return on assets (ROA) (LROA) and operating 
cash flow (CFO) are included to control for the effect of performance on earnings management 
                                                 
16 We use the actual proceeds because we do not have a measure for target proceeds. Additionally, the results remain 
the same if instead of the offer price we use is first-trading-day price. 
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(Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005).17 Finally, we include year- and 
industry-fixed effects.  
3.4 The Sample  
We identify companies from the SDC New Issues database that were first-time issuers between 
1990 and 2009 in the US and not previously listed elsewhere. Foreign firms are incorporated firms 
whose primary executive offices are located outside of the US (Bruner, Chaplinsky, & Ramchand, 
2006).18 We exclude equity listings that originated from spin-offs of publicly listed companies or 
from mergers and acquisitions. We further eliminate warrants, units and rights offerings, and utility 
firms and financial service firms based in the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, and Bermuda for tax 
purposes. We also exclude all firms with insufficient financial data.  
 Panel A of Table 1 provides information regarding the sample formation analyzed between 
foreign and domestic IPOs. Panel B presents the sample industry composition according to the 
Fama-French (FF) 12-industry classification. This panel shows that the largest group of IPOs in 
the sample is from the Business Equipment industry (FF6), followed by Healthcare, Medical 
Equipment, and Drugs (FF10). Panel C reports the distributions of IPOs according to the country 
of origin in five periodic windows from 1990–2009.19 Consistent with other studies on foreign 
issuers in the US, the largest number of IPOs is from Israel (64), followed by China (46), the UK 
(32), and Canada (29). Most of the IPOs take place before 2001, when the internet and dot.com 
bubble burst.    
                                                 
17 If Model 1 is correctly specified, CFO is orthogonal to abnormal accruals (the error term in (1)). However, if Model 
1 suffers from an omitted variable problem, ABNACC and CFO may be correlated. It is plausible that without CFO, 
Eq. (3) may suffer from the same problem. Hence, including CFO in (3) helps to mitigate the omitted correlated 
variable problem.   
18 We confirmed that the SEC defines foreign IPOs in our sample as foreign registrants (see 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml). 
19 These periods were also used in estimating Model 1. 
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We manually extract many of the variables needed for the empirical investigation from each 
foreign firm’s prospectus. We complement this by searching the SEC’s Edgar database and the 
Perfect Filing database. Foreign currency figures are translated into US dollar figures based on the 
exchange rates disclosed in the prospectuses. We obtain financial information of the domestic US 
IPOs from COMPUSTAT and SDC Platinum. Importantly, financial information in the foreign 
prospectuses is prepared under US GAAP. Hence, changes in home countries’ accounting rules 
are not expected to influence our findings.20 We index monetary variables to the 2005 US dollar 
value based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as reported by the International Monetary Fund.21  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Panel A 
presents a summary for abnormal accruals measured using mature US firms and the IPO sample 
as the two benchmarks for estimating Model 1. The table also reports descriptive statistics for the 
full sample, the domestic US IPO subsample, and the foreign IPOs subsample, as well as a 
univariate analysis of differences between the two subsamples. Using the mature firms’ 
benchmark, the mean of ABNACC is negative and statistically different from zero, suggesting that 
IPO firms are more conservative than mature firms. This finding is consistent with heightened 
scrutiny and monitoring effects that dominate incentives to inflate pre-IPO earnings (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008). While both domestic and foreign IPOs are conservative relative to mature 
firms, a comparison of the means and medians indicates domestic IPOs are more conservative than 
                                                 
20 In our sample there are only nine IPOs that report under IFRS. Nevertheless, in Section 5.5 we investigate whether 
IFRS adoption in the IPO’s home country affects the results.  
21 Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm#data on April 2011. 
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foreign IPOs. This finding is also the case when abnormal accruals are measured within the IPO 
sample, which provides preliminary evidence with respect to our first research question.22  
Turning to the IPO sample, it is evident that the domestic IPOs and foreign IPOs subsamples 
are different, apart from leverage.23 The mean of INST is lower in foreign IPOs than in domestic 
US IPOs, which is consistent with US legal institutions being stronger than foreign institutions, on 
average. Foreign IPOs attract higher proceeds, as seen from LPROC. Foreign IPOs are larger and 
report higher sales. Inspecting CFO and LROA indicates that foreign IPOs perform better than 
their domestic counterparts, as per prospectus financials.  
Panel B further analyzes the foreign IPOs subsample, distinguishing between home countries 
with strong (INST=1) and weak (INST=0) institutions, based on whether the IPO country of origin 
is from the first cluster in Leuz (2010) or otherwise, (i.e., strong and weak respectively). This 
results in classifying 56% of the observations as strong home institutions. A comparison of 
abnormal accruals (ABNACC) indicates that foreign IPOs with weak home institutions are more 
conservative than foreign IPOs with strong home institutions, on average. Note that IPOs with 
weak home institutions employ relatively larger auditors, generate more sales and CFO, and raise 
more money from the IPO.  
In an untabulated analysis we compare the statistics for each variable used for the estimation of 
abnormal accrual levels in the pooled IPO sample. We find mean accruals (ACC) is significantly 
more negative in domestic IPOs, indicating greater conservatism in domestic IPOs. The mean 
indicator for negative CFO (DCFO) is significantly higher in the domestic subsample, consistent 
with Panel A.  
                                                 
22 In the remainder of the paper, ABNACC is measured with respect to the IPO sample. 
23 To address the differences between the samples, we run robustness tests (unreported) that restrict the domestic US-
firm sample to observations with LTA and LPROC of at least the minimum values of these variables in the foreign 
sample. These did not yield any material differences in our findings. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients for the various variables. The correlation between 
ABNACC and FOREIGN is small, suggesting little effect of foreignness on signed abnormal 
accruals in a single factor analysis. The correlation between the abnormal accruals measure and 
INST is insignificant. INST and FOREIGN are highly and negatively correlated, since INST 
assumes highest values for US IPOs that are 75% of the entire sample. Therefore, we do not use 
both variables in the same regression model. No correlation value is reported for FOREIGN with 
SEC_ENF, since we do not have a measure of SEC enforcement for domestic US firms. The 
correlation between FOREIGN and PLIT is -0.70, consistent with lower private litigation in foreign 
firms. Relatively high and negative correlations are shared between HOME_ENF, SEC_ENF, 
PLIT on one hand and INST on the other hand. However, INST is not used together with these three 
variables in any of the tests. All other correlations are quite small with the exception of the 
correlation between LROA and CFO. We nevertheless verify that multicollinearity does not affect 
our inferences in subsequent analyses. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Main Findings  
 
4.1 Threats of Enforcement and Private Litigation 
As explained in Section 3.3, we first aim to establish if the threat of private litigation is lower 
for foreign firms using Model 3b.24 We run it with two specifications. The first includes all 
individual IPOs and the second is run at the country level. Accordingly, in the second specification, 
GDP is replaced with GDP_Av, which is a country-level average based on the years in which IPOs 
                                                 




from that country took place. The advantage of the first approach is that the sample reflects IPO 
frequency for each country. Such frequency may also influence the frequency of enforcement and 
litigation. In the second specification, this frequency does not play a role, as each country appears 
only once. The main variable of interest in these specifications is FOREIGN. We find that the 
coefficient on FOREIGN is negative and highly significant in both specifications (p-value < 0.01) 
(results are untabulated). This is consistent with a lower threat of private litigation for foreign IPOs 
than domestic US IPOs.  
Next, we run Models 3a (for SEC_ENF) and 3b (for PLIT) using the foreign IPOs subsample, 
in which INST is the main variable of interest. Here, too, we use the abovementioned two 
specifications (firm level and country level). Panel A of Table 4 presents the estimation results. 
Starting with SEC enforcement, the coefficient on INST is negative and highly significant in both 
specifications. This is consistent with the SEC directing more enforcement resources to IPOs 
originating from countries with weak institutions. With private litigation, we find a similar result 
in the first specification, but not in the country-level specification.25 We note, however, that for 
this specification we have the smallest number of observations. Overall, we infer from these 
findings IPOs from foreign countries are sued less than domestic US IPOs, and IPOs originating 
from countries with weak institutions are exposed to greater enforcement and litigation threats than 
IPOs originating from countries with strong institutions.  
Panel B reports the results for Model 4, which examines the relation between signed abnormal 
accruals and SEC enforcement threat (Columns 1–3), or private litigation threat (Columns 4–6). 
Starting with SEC enforcement, in Column 1 we use the entire foreign IPO sample. Here the 
coefficient on SEC_ENF is negative and significant at 1%, suggesting that a stronger enforcement 
                                                 
25 For PLIT we have fewer observations as we do not have data for all countries (mainly Canada).  
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threat reduces abnormal accruals. In Column 2 we repeat this analysis while restricting the sample 
to foreign IPOs from strong institutions countries. Consistent with lower enforcement threat for 
these IPOs, we find no constraining effect for SEC_ENF on abnormal accruals. In contrast, in 
Column 3, in which we focus on IPOs from countries with weak institutions, the coefficient on 
SEC_ENF is negative and significant at less than 6%. This is consistent with a stronger 
enforcement threat for IPOs originating from countries with weak legal institutions. The difference 
in the coefficient on SEC_ENF between the two subsamples is 15.957 and it is highly significant 
(p-value = 0.002). When we repeat the analysis using the threat of private litigation (Columns 4–
6), the results are similar in nature. That is, a greater threat of private litigation is associated with 
less earnings management for IPOs originating from countries with weak home institutions.26 
However, the difference in the coefficient on PLIT between the two subsamples is 0.078, and it is 
statistically insignificant. In untabulated analysis we also run Model 4 on the entire IPO sample 
using PLIT as the main variable of interest. We find the coefficient on PLIT is negative and 
significant (p-value = 0.045). This is consistent with domestic US IPOs that face a greater threat 
of private litigation and hence manage earnings less aggressively than foreign IPOs. 
Inspecting controls that are statistically significant, we offer two noteworthy observations. First, 
there seems to be a constraining effect for large auditors. Second, foreign high-tech firms report 
more conservatively. However, both results are confined to IPOs from weak home institutions.  
Taken together, the results reported in Table 4 suggest enforcement and private litigations 
threats are stronger for foreign IPOs originating from countries characterized by weaker legal 
institutions. Consequently, these IPOs manage earnings less than IPOs from countries 
characterized by strong institutions, consistent with H2.  
                                                 
26 We also verified that these results are robust to self-selection. We discuss self-selection in Section 5.1. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2 Abnormal Accruals, IPO Foreignness, and Home Institutions 
In Table 4 we examine the relation between the threats of enforcement and litigation and 
earnings management in foreign IPOs. Our next analysis, reported in Table 5, concerns the direct 
link between home institutions and foreignness on one hand, and earnings management on the 
other hand. Starting with the foreign IPOs subsample (Column 1), the coefficient on INST is 
positive (p-value = 0.039). This finding implies abnormal accruals are larger in foreign IPOs from 
strong institutions countries and is consistent with lower litigation and enforcement threats for 
these IPOs. Column 2 reports the results for the full sample where FOREIGN replaces INST; this 
allows us to compare earnings management in foreign IPOs relative to domestic US IPOs (our 
H1). Here the coefficient on FOREIGN is positive and significant at 3.5%, indicating earnings 
inflation is higher at foreign IPOs, which is consistent with H1. In Column 3 we repeat this analysis 
by adding an indicator variable for foreign IPOs that originate from strong home institutions 
(FOREIGN_STRONG_INST). Under this specification, FOREIGN captures the average degree by 
which abnormal accruals in foreign IPOs from weak home institutions exceed abnormal accruals 
in domestic US IPOs; FOREIGN_STRONG_INST then captures the incremental effect on 
abnormal accruals for foreign IPOs from strong institutions over foreign IPOs from weak 
institutions. The finding that the coefficient on FOREIGN is insignificant indicates earnings 
management in domestic IPOs and foreign IPOs from weak institutions is similar in magnitude, 
on average. The positive and highly significant coefficient for FOREIGN_STRONG_INST 
indicates that abnormal accruals are higher, on average, in IPOs from strong institutions than both 
US firms and other foreign firms. In Column 4 we use the subsample of foreign IPOs from strong 
institutions countries. Here the coefficient on FOREIGN is positive and significant (p-value = 
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0.01), consistent with higher earnings management in foreign IPOs from strong institutions 
countries than domestic US IPOs. In Column 5 we compare IPOs from weak home institutions to 
domestic US IPOs and find that the coefficient on FOREIGN is insignificant.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
On the whole, we conclude from Table 5 that foreign IPOs inflate earnings more than domestic 
US IPOs, consistent with H1. In addition, supporting H2, the evidence indicates that within foreign 
IPOs, earnings inflation increases with the IPO’s strength of home country institutions, as implied 
by the threats of lower enforcement and private litigation.  
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1 Self-selection 
One concern with the abovementioned findings is that the coefficients are inconsistent owing 
to a selection bias. Specifically, we know from Panel B of Table 2 that IPOs from countries with 
strong institutions tend to come from the high-tech sector, are smaller, less profitable, and raise 
smaller proceeds. The pressure to raise funds may favor listing in the richer US market, especially 
for loss-making firms. Once deciding to list in the US, such fledgling firms also face stronger 
incentives to inflate earnings. To address the selection bias, we run a two-step procedure following 
Heckman (1979).27 In the first step we estimate the probability of listing in the US (US_Listing). 
Here US_Listing = 1 for foreign IPOs conducted in the US, or both in the US and home country 
(N=300), while US_Listing = 0 for IPOs conducted exclusively outside the US (N=1,396). 
Specifically, we identify and select from SDC Platinum all IPOs conducted only in the home 
country of the foreign IPOs in our sample in the same year and industry (using an FF12 
                                                 




classification). In the second step we re-run Table 5 after including the inverse Mills ratios (IMR) 
computed from the first step. Following guidance in Lennox, Francis, &  Wang (2011), the model 
in the first step uses a number of determinants of the decision to list in the US, several of which 
are excluded from the second step. Doidge et al. (2004, 2010) advocated the use of country-level 
instruments in the first stage (the selection stage). Several home country-level variables (other than 
INST) likely affect the listing decision, but are less likely to influence earnings management in the 
US. In accordance with this guidance, we include the home country’s GDP (GDP) to proxy for the 
size of the home country’s capital market and a measure of a country’s aggregate earnings 
management (AGG_EM, taken from Table 2 in Boulton et al., 2011). We add a measure of home 
enforcement, (HOME_ENF)28 to control for Licht’s (2003) suggestion that strict home regulation 
can cause local firms to conduct an IPO in the US.29 We also add our measures of SEC enforcement 
and private litigation threats, as these may deter a US listing, in which case we expect to find a 
negative coefficient. At the same time, these threats may attract a US listing by companies that 
want to signal their commitment to good governance. The selection of first-step regressors also 
includes several variables used in the second step, since they are likely related to both the listing 
decision and earnings management. LTA is included for firm size, LPROC proxies the intended 
size of the IPO, and HiTECH is included because high-technology firms likely find a US exchange 
more attractive (Caglio, Hanley, & Marietta-Westberg, 2016). The selection model (first step) is: 
 
                                                 
28 We use the country enforcement index as measured and presented in Brown, Preiato, &  Tarca (2014) by the country 
of origin of the foreign IPO and the IPO year. This index includes the US as well as our IPO foreign countries. This 
measure is excluded from the other models, as we do not expect enforcement in the country of origin to affect earnings 
management in US filings.  
29 We report pairwise correlations of HOME_ENF with other variables used in this study in Table 3. Notably, the 
correlation of HOME_ENF with FOREIGN is highly negative (at 0.60), since enforcement is strongest in the US. The 
correlation with INST is 0.40, as would be expected. In addition, the correlation with SOX is 0.60 reflecting increasing 
enforcement scores over time as documented in Brown et al. (2014).  
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             (6) 
Table 6 reports the results of this two-step procedure, with Panel A providing the results of the 
first step (the selection Model 6). Across the five columns of this panel, we present results for 
different combinations of HOME_ENF, SEC_ENF, and PLIT. When an IPO’s home enforcement 
is included on its own (Column 1), we find that it is positively related to the probability of US 
listing. However, when all three threat variables are included (Column 5), home enforcement turns 
insignificant. SEC_ENF is positively related to the probability of US listing regardless of whether 
it appears as the only threat variable or in a combination with any of the other two. We find no 
evidence the threat of private litigation in the US deters, or attracts, a US listing. Examining the 
other variables, we find that the likelihood of a US listing for a foreign firm increases in firm size 
and expected proceeds. High-tech firms are also more likely to conduct their IPOs in the US 
(Caglio et al., 2016). Size of the home country’s economy is negatively related to the listing 
probability. We also find evidence that the country level of earnings management explains the US 
listing decision (Column 2, 4–5).  
In Panel B of Table 6, we report the results of estimating Model 5 after the inclusion of the 
inverse Mills ratios obtained from each one of the five columns of Panel A. For brevity, we only 
report the coefficient on INST and on the inverse Mills ratios (IMR) obtained from the selection 
model. Across the five versions of the Mills ratios, the results are qualitatively similar to Column 
1 in Table 5. Specifically, the coefficient on INST is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level in the two rightmost models. The coefficients on IMR are statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that the selection bias, if any, is not directly related to earnings management by the 
foreign IPO. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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5.2 Insider Ownership, VC Backing, and Underwriter’s Rank 
Leuz (2006) argued that it is important to control for insider ownership in international studies 
of earnings management. Because ownership structures may be strongly influenced by home 
institutions, it is unclear if FOREIGN or INST capture differences in ownership structures rather 
than in underlying institutions. Therefore, we augment our main regression specifications (Tables 
4 and 5) by adding a control variable, INSIDER, which measures the percentage of stocks retained 
by original IPO owners following the IPO. The average value for INSIDER is high (0.728), and it 
is virtually identical across domestic US IPOs and foreign IPOs.30 In multivariate analyses we do 
not find that insider ownership is associated with signed abnormal accruals (not tabulated). This 
stands in contrast to Leuz (2006)’s finding of a positive relation between earnings management 
and insider ownership in cross-listed firms. With regard to our main findings (Tables 4 and 5), the 
signs and significance levels of the coefficients on SEC_ENF, PLIT, FOREIGN, and INST remain 
similar to those reported previously. We therefore conclude that our results do not reflect 
ownership-driven incentives to engage in earnings management.  
In the main specification we use auditor size to capture monitoring mechanisms that likely 
constrain earnings management. Clearly, auditors are not the only agents that play such a role. The 
IPO literature has identified a similar role with venture capitalists (VC) (Chahine, Arthurs, 
Filatotchev, & Hoskisson, 2012; Nam, Park, & Arthurs, 2014) and reputable underwriters (Carter 
and Manaster, 1990). We therefore further control for VC backing and underwriters’ ranking by 
adding an indicator variable VC and a control variable UW_Rank to the main regression 
specifications (Tables 4 and 5). VC is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 when the IPO is 
backed by a VC, as identified in SDC Platinum and 0 otherwise. UW_Rank is the rank of the 
                                                 
30 Insider ownership is similar in foreign IPOs from countries with strong home institutions and in foreign IPOs from 
countries with weak home institutions. 
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leading underwriter, as identified in SDC Platinum and reported on Jay Ritter’s website.31 The 
average value for UW_Rank is 7.85, and it is virtually identical across domestic US IPOs and 
foreign IPOs. A t-test on VC reveals that the number of VC-backed US IPOs is larger than foreign 
IPOs. Adding these variables largely does not alter our main inferences from Tables 4 and 532 (not 
tabulated).  
5.3 IPO Multi-listings  
While most of our foreign IPOs list their stock exclusively in the US, in our sample 65 foreign 
firms simultaneously conduct an IPO in the US and in their home countries.33 Our results may be 
therefore attributed to the fact that such firms cannot exclusively bond to US regulations. We thus 
add to Models 4 and 5 an indicator variable (MULTI) if an observation belongs to a simultaneous 
foreign IPO. If incentives to report conservatively in pre-IPO earnings were stronger (weaker) for 
multi-country IPOs (owing to an additional and dilutive monitoring effect), we would expect to 
find that the coefficient on MULTI is negative (positive). In an untabulated analysis we find that 
Panel B of Table 4 and Table 5 remain intact after adding MULTI to the regression specification.  
5.4 Choice of US Exchange 
Foreign IPOs can choose on which US exchange to list their stock. Frost, Gordon, &  Hayes 
(2006) argued that disclosure rules, monitoring, and enforcement may vary across exchanges and 
that exchange membership can thus add an extra layer of monitoring and enforcement over and 
above that set by the SEC and other regulators. It is possible that exchange membership is 
correlated with FOREIGN and INST because IPOs from the same country may flock to the same 
                                                 
31 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm  
32 In Column 6 of Panel B of Table 4 (the subsample of foreign IPOs from weak institutions countries) PLIT turns 
insignificant once we control for VC backing. However, PLIT remains negative in the entire foreign sample.  
33 This multi-listing involves 19 foreign countries, with the UK leading the other markets (15 observations).  
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exchange and benefit from sharing listing experience. If the exchange-listing decision is driven by 
factors that are correlated with home institutions, we may be incorrectly attributing our results to 
the IPO’s home country’s security laws. To test this idea, we add indicators for NYSE and AMSE 
in Models 4 and 5. Our main findings are robust to this modification.  
5.5 Changes in Reporting Standards in Home Countries  
 As our sample period is quite long, possible changes in home institutions over time may 
influence our findings. In particular, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) and a greater enforcement threat in home countries may have affected incentives to inflate 
earnings in the prospectus of an IPO. However, we have only nine observations where IFRS is 
used; hence we do not have enough variation in the data to explore an IFRS effect. Nonetheless, 
in 68 observations, foreign IPOs use home GAAP and reconcile to US GAAP. We examine 
whether this group drives our results by adding an indicator for reconciliations in Models 4 and 5. 
In both Tables 4 and 5 controlling for reconciliations does not alter our inferences, after adding 
this indicator.   
 
5.6 Pricing of Abnormal Accruals 
While earnings management may be associated with several incentives, one possible 
explanation debated in the literature is attempts by managers to influence stock prices. It has been 
proposed an equilibrium exists whereby investors expect managers to inflate earnings and given 
this belief, managers’ best reaction is to meet these expectations (Shivakumar, 2000; Stein, 1989). 
However, in this equilibrium, investors do not price abnormal accruals, on average. To investigate 
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The dependent variable in Model 7 is the market value of the IPO at the beginning of the first 
trading day, scaled by pre-IPO total assets. The main variable of interest is ANBACC. We report 
the results in Table 7, which is structured similarly to Table 5. Across all four columns of this 
table, the coefficient on ABNACC is insignificant, indicating that abnormal accruals are not priced 
regardless of IPOs’ country of origin.34 Additionally, in Column 1 the coefficient on INST is 
negative, while in Column 3 the coefficient on FOREIGN is lower than the same coefficient in 
Column 4 (0.128 vs. 0.318). Taken together, these results suggest IPOs originating from strong- 
institution countries attract lower valuations, on average, than IPOs from weak-institution 
countries and their pricing is closer to the pricing of US IPOs. When all foreign IPOs are pooled 
together with domestic US IPOs (Column 2), the coefficient on FOREIGN is positive and highly 
significant. This suggests that investors in the primary market assign a price premium to foreign 
IPOs relative to domestic IPOs, although the price premium is lower for IPOs originating from 
strong-institution countries.35  
6. Summary and Conclusions 
We provide evidence pertaining to the bonding hypothesis in the context of the US IPO market. 
Our results suggest higher SEC enforcement and private litigation threats for IPOs originating 
from countries with weak institutions than IPOs from countries with strong institutions. Greater 
enforcement and litigations threats, in turn, are associated with reduced earnings management. 
                                                 
34 These findings hold also when we drop FOREIGN and INST from the model specification and when we control for 
self-selection in Column 1. 
35 A further analysis of the pricing implications of FOREIGN is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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This is particularly pronounced for IPOs originating from countries with weak institutions (that 
manage earnings at levels similar to domestic US IPOs). However, we do not find that earnings 
management is priced. 
 As our results suggest that enforcement and litigation are not applied with a similar force to 
domestic and foreign IPOs, we conclude the bonding hypothesis does not seem to hold in this 
market. The reasons we provide for this finding relate to how the liability of foreignness in the US 
IPO market is likely associated with perceptions of (or trust in) foreign institutions. In particular, 
we conclude the degree of bonding is inversely related to the strength of foreign institutions. We 
rule out several alternative explanations that may be behind this relation, including selection bias, 
insider ownership, and choice of US exchange. 
The result that bonding is inversely related to institutions is surprising in light of prior research 
that has found mature cross-listed firms from countries with weak legal institutions inflate earnings 
to a greater extent than similar firms from strong home institutions. Future research can further 
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Table 1. Sample Description 
Panel A: Sample Development 
 US Foreign Total 
All SDC Platinum US and foreign IPOs in years 1990–2009 4948 647 5595 
Less observations:    
For which prospectus not available  - 136 136 
With offering other than common/ordinary stock - 117 117 
For financial services firms and utilities 1498 19 1517 
Initial sample 3450 375 3825 
Insufficient financial data necessary for comparing abnormal 
accruals in IPOs to mature US firms (Table 2) 2427 34 2461 
Sample used in mature US benchmark (Table 2) 1023 341 1364 
Insufficient data for control variables  54 41 95 
Sample with available controls 969 300 1269 
Less than ten observations for year and industry matching 
required to calculate abnormal accruals in IPO sample 13 0 13 
Final abnormal accruals IPO Sample 956 300 1256 
 
Panel B: Sample Selection by Fama-French 12 Industry Classification 
  US Foreign Total 
FF1 Consumer Non-Durables 21 6 27 
FF2 Consumer Durables 14 5 19 
FF3 Manufacturing 52 21 73 
FF4 Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 20 2 22 
FF5 Chemicals and Allied Products - - - 
FF6 Business Equipment 366 143 509 
FF7 Telephone and Television Transmission 36 38 74 
FF8 Utilities - - - 
FF9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 89 7 96 
FF10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 197 29 226 
FF11 Finance - - - 
FF12 Other 161 49 210 









Panel C: IPO Country of Origin by Period 
Country 1990–1993 1994–1997 1998–2001 2002–2005 2006–2009 Total 
Argentina 0 0 3 0 1 4 
Australia 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Belgium 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Brazil 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Canada 3 9 12 2 3 29 
China 0 0 5 14 27 46 
Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Finland 0 1 0 0 0 1 
France 0 6 4 0 0 10 
Germany 0 2 5 0 0 7 
Greece 0 0 3 2 2 7 
Hong Kong 0 9 3 3 0 15 
India 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Ireland 0 4 5 0 2 11 
Israel 9 22 23 5 5 64 
Italy 1 3 1 1 0 6 
Japan 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Mexico 2 0 0 1 0 3 
Netherlands 2 14 4 0 1 21 
New Zealand 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Norway 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Poland 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Singapore 1 3 2 0 1 7 
South-Korea 0 1 3 3 1 8 
Spain 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Sweden 0 3 1 0 0 4 
Switzerland 0 3 3 1 0 7 
UK 2 18 10 2 0 32 
US 26 311 282 244 106 956 
Total 47 418 376 279 149 1256 
 
Notes: The table presents the sample selection process (Panel A), composition by industry (Panel B), composition by country 
and by period and country (Panel C). Panel A: Two observations are missing for INST further reducing the controls sample 
to 1276. We lose three further observations for incomplete panel when analyzing abnormal accruals in Tables 4 and 7. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of the Main Variables and Univariate Analysis Comparing Domestic and Foreign IPOs 
 Full Sample Domestic US IPOs Foreign IPOs 
 N Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 N Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 N Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
Mature US Firms benchmark                 
ABNACC 1364 -0.268 0.929 -0.245 -0.037 0.043 1023 -0.323 0.997 -0.287 -0.050 0.031 341 -0.104*** 0.662 -0.125 -0.007*** 0.118 
IPO Sample                  
ABNACC 1256 -0.002 0.624 -0.113 0.028 0.213 956 -0.044 0.594 -0.129 0.018 0.187 300 0.132*** 0.697 -0.078 0.068 0.317 
FOREIGN 1256 0.239 0.427 0.000 0.000 0.000 956 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 300 1.000*** 0.000 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 
INST 1256 0.896 0.306 1.000 1.000 1.000 956 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 300 0.563*** 0.497 0.000 1.000*** 1.000 
MTB 1103 0.160 0.327 0.025 0.063 0.149 803 0.117 0.189 0.024 0.060 0.123 300 0.275*** 0.529 0.027 0.085*** 0.233 
HOME_ENF 1256 39.755 10.423 39.000 39.000 53.000 956 43.657 6.600 39.000 39.000 53.000 300 27.320 10.632 18.000 26.500*** 37.000 
SEC_ENF 300 0.016 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.027 0 . . . . . 300 0.016 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.027 
PLIT 270 2.493 1.465 2.100 2.260 3.230 0 . . . . . 270 2.493 1.465 2.100 2.260 3.230 
LITIG 1256 0.259 0.438 0.000 0.000 1.000 956 0.277 0.448 0.000 0.000 1.000 300 0.205*** 0.401 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
AUD 1256 0.740 0.439 0.000 1.000 1.000 956 0.705 0.456 0.000 1.000 1.000 300 0.850*** 0.354 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 
SOX 1256 0.334 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 956 0.357 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 300 0.261*** 0.441 0.000 0.000*** 1.000 
LTA 1256 17.746 1.670 16.680 17.494 18.649 956 17.695 1.527 16.703 17.478 18.507 300 17.932** 2.056 16.593 17.535 19.288 
LPROC 1256 18.051 1.025 17.500 18.048 18.594 956 17.968 0.905 17.485 17.978 18.489 300 18.300*** 1.303 17.636 18.260*** 19.071 
HiTECH 1256 0.486 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 956 0.449 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 300 0.204 0.489 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LEV 1256 0.204 0.179 0.039 0.169 0.338 956 0.205 0.178 0.042 0.169 0.338 300 0.599*** 0.184 0.034 0.161*** 0.339 
LSALES 1256 16.888 3.828 16.174 17.406 18.683 956 16.761 4.039 16.154 17.418 18.687 300 17.295** 3.029 16.190 17.385 18.617 
CFO 1256 -0.363 1.392 -0.461 0.038 0.185 956 -0.431 1.410 -0.594 0.021 0.169 300 -0.147*** 1.313 -0.165 0.074*** 0.218 









































Panel B: Summary Statistics of Foreign IPOs and a Univariate Analysis Comparing Weak and Strong Home 
Institutions using Leuz’s (2010) Classification 
 Weak Home Institutions Strong Home Institutions 
 N Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 N Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
ABNACC 131 0.036 0.418 -0.100 0.032 0.280 169 0.206** 0.847 -0.051 0.089* 0.340 
MTB 131 0.295 0.594 0.016 0.060 0.200 169 0.258 0.475 0.035 0.098 0.264 
HOME_ENF 131 26.435 10.483 16.000 28.000 37.000 169 28.006 10.727 18.000 24.000 38.000 
SEC_ENF 131 0.027 0.017 0.018 0.027 0.027 169 0.008*** 0.004 0.007 0.007*** 0.008 
PLIT 130 3.151 1.777 2.730 3.230 3.990 140 1.882*** 0.666 1.790 2.100*** 2.260 
LITIG 131 0.221 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.000 169 0.174 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AUD 131 0.916 0.278 1.000 1.000 1.000 169 0.796*** 0.398 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 
SOX 131 0.405 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 169 0.144*** 0.362 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
LTA 131 18.654 1.856 17.301 18.210 19.654 169 17.326*** 2.023 16.157 16.983*** 18.334 
LPROC 131 18.793 1.206 18.156 18.610 19.349 169 17.911*** 1.256 17.148 17.906*** 18.579 
HiTECH 131 0.221 0.177 0.082 0.196 0.341 169 0.671** 0.189 0.015 0.127** 0.338 
LEV 131 0.519 0.502 0.000 1.000 1.000 169 0.194 0.470 0.000 1.000*** 1.000 
LSALES 131 18.220 2.175 16.970 18.003 19.279 169 16.579*** 3.389 15.833 17.000*** 17.911 
CFO 131 0.070 0.839 -0.076 0.098 0.258 169 -0.273** 1.568 -0.274 0.029*** 0.207 







Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample as well as for distinguishing between domestic US IPOs and foreign IPOs. Panel A reports the 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main tests. Panel B reports the differences between IPOs from strong (INST=1) and weak (INST=0) home institutions 
within the foreign subsample. INST is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the IPO firm comes from a country that is classified by Leuz (2010) as belonging 
to the first cluster in Panel C of Table 3 (i.e., regarded as having the strongest institutions); zero otherwise. The results of tests for the differences in the means and 
medians (the latter using Wilcoxon rank-test) are reported under the Foreign IPOs block (in Panels A) and the Strong Home Institutions block (in Panel B). * , **, *** 















































































FOREIGN 0.12                
INST -0.02 -0.62               
MTA -0.03 0.21 -0.15              
HOME_ENF -0.07 -0.67 0.43 -0.12             
SEC_ENF -0.12 - -0.63 0.01 0.21            
PLIT -0.09 -0.70 -0.43 -0.01 0.26 0.62           
AUD 0.08 0.14 -0.14 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.07          
SOX 0.00 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0.60 0.11 0.18 -0.05         
LEV -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.11 -0.01 -0.13 -0.05        
LPROC 0.00 0.14 -0.25 0.12 -0.13 0.28 0.13 -0.08 0.20 0.13       
LSALES 0.03 0.06 -0.12 -0.17 -0.13 0.23 0.04 -0.11 -0.01 0.20 0.33      
CFO 0.05 0.10 -0.11 -0.25 -0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.11 -0.03 0.15 0.38     
LROA 0.16 0.12 -0.13 -0.29 -0.10 0.15 0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.16 0.40 0.75    
LTA 0.04 0.06 -0.19 -0.30 -0.08 0.21 0.05 -0.10 0.18 0.23 0.69 0.50 0.29 0.36   
LITIG -0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.03 0.15 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.13 -0.10 -0.06 -0.20 -0.07 -0.11 -0.05  
HiTECH 0.01 0.13 -0.03 0.12 -0.16 -0.20 0.01 0.00 -0.12 -0.12 0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 
 
Note: The table presents Pearson pair-wise correlations for selected variables. Correlations equal or above 0.08 and equal or below -0.08 are significant at 






















Panel B – Signed Abnormal Accruals, SEC Enforcement, and Private Litigation  
Dependent variable: ABNACC SEC Enforcement Actions  Private Litigation 













CONSTANT 0.871 1.125 -0.639  0.736 1.736 -0.766 
 (0.141) (0.278) (0.262)  (0.356) (0.202) (0.145) 
Main test variable (THREAT)        
SEC_ENF -3.572** 9.623 -6.334*     
 (0.011) (0.146) (0.057)     
PLIT     -0.031** 0.015 -0.063* 
     (0.024) (0.719) (0.078) 
Variables capturing other sources of scrutiny   
LITIG 0.053 0.014 0.019  0.074 0.104 0.085 
 (0.612) (0.951) (0.750)  (0.123) (0.330) (0.244) 
AUD -0.147** -0.146 -0.154*  -0.142** -0.091 -0.200** 
 (0.034) (0.215) (0.083)  (0.026) (0.590) (0.045) 
SOX -0.612*** 0.382 -0.173  -0.274 0.407*** 0.113 
 (0.010) (0.145) (0.444)  (0.147) (0.003) (0.703) 
LTA 0.046 0.075 0.015  0.037 0.068 0.024 
 (0.302) (0.356) (0.799)  (0.203) (0.150) (0.672) 
Variables capturing incentives to inflate earnings   
LPROC -0.037 -0.108 0.015  -0.068 -0.197 0.016 
 (0.574) (0.376) (0.743)  (0.378) (0.155) (0.692) 
HiTECH -0.181* -0.092 -0.414***  -0.159** -0.095 -0.370*** 
 (0.058) (0.528) (0.005)  (0.025) (0.536) (0.000) 
LEV 0.063 0.121 -0.191  -0.179* -0.126 -0.359 
 (0.663) (0.674) (0.598)  (0.086) (0.583) (0.320) 
Other control variables     
LSALES -0.022 -0.031 0.038  0.010 0.041 0.025 
 (0.593) (0.607) (0.512)  (0.525) (0.177) (0.669) 
CFO -0.036 0.036 -0.135  -0.045 0.028 -0.128 
 (0.339) (0.499) (0.155)  (0.326) (0.645) (0.136) 
LROA -0.149 -0.289 0.262**  -0.158 -0.339 0.239** 
 (0.334) (0.249) (0.029)  (0.322) (0.138) (0.024) 
Year and industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 300 169 131  270 140 130 
Adj R2 0.040 0.011 0.144  0.037 0.001 0.141 
 
Dependent variable:  SEC_ENF  PLIT 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 By Firm By Country  By Firm By Country 
CONSTANT -0.005 -0.005  1.664*** 0.104 
 (0.615) (0.510)  (0.002) (0.901) 
INST -0.018*** -0.013**  -1.223*** -0.874 
 (0.000) (0.029)  (0.000) (0.133) 
AGG_EM 0.001*** 0.001  0.037** 0.045 
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.011) (0.242) 
GDP 0.543**   18.643***  
 (0.021)   (0.000)  
GDP_Av  0.610**   43.027 
  (0.029)   (0.113) 
N 300 28  270 26 
R2 0.537 0.303  0.197 0.187 
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Notes: The table presents results of the regression models of SEC enforcement and private litigation. Panel A presents the 
estimation results for Models 3a and 3b—i.e., SEC enforcement and private litigation, respectively. Columns 1 and 3 include all 
300 foreign IPOs and columns 2 and 4 are at the country level. Panel B presents results of the regression models of signed 
abnormal accruals with the variables of interest being SEC enforcement (SEC_ENF) and private litigation (PLIT) in columns (1)-
(3) and Columns (4)–(6), respectively. Columns (1) and (4) present regression results for Model 4 for the whole sample of foreign 
firms. Columns (2) and (5) present regression for Model 4 for IPOs from strong institutions while columns (3) and (6) present 
regression for Model 4 for IPOs from weak institutions while Columns (3) and (6). p-values based on standard errors corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the industry level are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *,**,*** 






Table 5. Signed Abnormal Accruals, IPO Foreignness, and Home Institutions 
Dependent variable: ABNACC      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Foreign 
Sample 
Full Sample Full Sample Strong + US Weak + US 
CONSTANT 0.647 0.043 -0.101 -0.003 -0.448 
 (0.219) (0.866) (0.684) (0.993) (0.141) 
Main test variables      
FOREIGN  0.181** 0.030 0.285*** -0.014 
  (0.035) (0.547) (0.009) (0.732) 
FOREIGN_STRONG_INST   0.260***   
   (0.000)   
INST 0.102**     
 (0.039)     
Variables capturing other sources of scrutiny      
LITIG 0.031 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 0.016 
 (0.763) (0.902) (0.925) (0.913) (0.826) 
AUD -0.137* 0.103** 0.119** 0.117** 0.148*** 
 (0.065) (0.035) (0.021) (0.019) (0.003) 
SOX -0.518** -0.048 -0.145 0.175** -0.072 
 (0.026) (0.675) (0.116) (0.041) (0.497) 
LTA 0.055 0.015 0.019 0.011 0.034** 
 (0.256) (0.304) (0.218) (0.503) (0.032) 
Variables capturing incentives to inflate earnings      
LPROC -0.042 -0.030 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.496) (0.344) (0.511) (0.609) (0.474) 
HiTECH -0.217* 0.031 0.028 0.044 0.005 
 (0.056) (0.707) (0.709) (0.524) (0.951) 
LEV 0.002 0.056 0.064 0.043 -0.062 
 (0.992) (0.481) (0.437) (0.506) (0.410) 
Other control variables      
LSALES -0.022 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.585) (0.772) (0.847) (0.863) (0.763) 
CFO -0.044 -0.079** -0.081** -0.078** -0.095** 
 (0.250) (0.026) (0.024) (0.036) (0.013) 
LROA -0.179 0.221** 0.222** 0.222** 0.300*** 
 (0.296) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.000) 
      
Year and industry FE Yes Yes YES Yes Yes 
N 300 1256 1256 1123 1089 
Adj R2 0.036 0.040 0.048 0.042 0.092 
 
Notes: The table presents results of the regression models of signed abnormal accruals. Column (1) presents regression 
results for Model 5 using only the foreign subsample. Columns (2) and (3) present regression results for Model 5 for the full 
sample. Columns (4) and (5) present regression results for Model 5 for the sample of US IPOs and foreign IPOs from strong 
or weak institutions, respectively. p-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the 
industry level are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *,**,*** indicate significance at the two tailed 10%, 




Table 6. Self-selection Regression 
Panel A: Probit Regression 
Dependent variable: 
Probability of US Listing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CONSTANT -3.969*** -6.555*** -5.66*** -6.918*** -7.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LTA 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.84*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
LPROC 0.194*** 0.207*** 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.223*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AGG_EM 0.004 0.037*** 0.147* 0.040*** 0.039*** 
 (0.504) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000)  
HOME_ENF 0.039***    0.005 
 (0.000)    (0.435) 
SEC_ENF  0.097***  0.095*** 0.086*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
PLIT   0.021 -0.011 -0.123 
   (0.446) (0.699) (0.655) 
HiTECH 0.407*** 0.463*** 0.464*** 0.486*** 0.486*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP -46.588*** -39.601*** -38.748*** -37.236*** -38.750*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1696 1696 1564 1564 1564 
Pseudo R2 0.327 0.354 0.325 0.344 0.344 
 
Panel B -Signed Abnormal Accruals, INST, and Inverse Mills Ratio  
Dependent variable:  
ABNACC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CONSTANT 0.707** 0.663 0.368 0.501 0.492 
 (0.047) (0.152) (0.578) 0.486 (0.480) 
Main test variables      
INST 0.105* 0.103* 0.135* 0.147** 0.146* 
 (0.075) (0.070) (0.089) (0.047) (0.051) 
IMR -0.018 -0.009 0.023 -0.037 -0.290 
 (0.845) (0.890) (0817) (0.574) (0.664) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 300 296 266 266 266 
Adj R2 0.036 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.034 
 
Notes: The table presents results of the regression models of signed abnormal accruals using a Heckman two-stage selection 
model to address potential selection bias concerns. Panel A presents the binary probit estimation results for US listings 
(IPOs in the US, or in the US and home country, are assigned the value 1, while IPOs conducted exclusively in firm’s 
foreign country are assigned 0). Columns (1)-(3) present the results with the inclusion of home enforcement measure 
(HOME_ENF), SEC enforcement (SEC_ENF) and private litigation (PLIT), respectively. Column (4) presents the results 
with the inclusion of both enforcement (SEC_ENF) and private litigation (PLIT). Column (5) presents the results with the 
inclusion of home enforcement measure (HOME_ENF), SEC enforcement (SEC_ENF) and private litigation (PLIT) 
together. Panel B presents results of the regression Model 5 of signed abnormal accruals with the inclusion of the inverse 
mills ratio (IMR) estimated in step 1 (Panel A). Columns (1)–(5) correspond to the estimation specifications reported in 
Columns (1)–(5) in Panel A. For brevity, we report only the coefficients on INST and IMR in Panel B. p-values based on 
standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the industry level are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. *,**,*** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See the Appendix 
for variable definitions. 
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Table 7. Analysis of IPO Market Values 
 
Dependent variable: MTA     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Foreign 
Sample 
Full Sample Strong + US Weak + US 
CONSTANT 2.151*** 1.047*** 0.890*** 1.155*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Main test variables     
ABNACC -0.033 -0.012 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.459) (0.407) (0.905) (0.956) 
FOREIGN  0.205*** 0.128*** 0.318*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INST -0.182***    
 (0.008)    
Control variables     
LITIG 0.266*** 0.049* 0.004 0.037 
 (0.006) (0.054) (0.848) (0.103) 
AUD 0.202*** 0.094*** 0.055*** 0.071*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) 
SOX -0.124 -0.147*** 0.040 -0.057 
 (0.551) (0.002) (0.576) (0.215) 
LTA -0.145*** -0.087*** -0.068*** -0.095*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HiTECH 0.348*** 0.045 0.003 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.181) (0.913) (0.720) 
LEV 0.128 0.148* 0.134* 0.112 
 (0.518) (0.050) (0.055) (0.120) 
LSALES 0.015 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.180) (0.572) (0.475) (0.956) 
CFO -0.057 -0.008 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.287) (0.658) (0.981) (0.844) 
LROA -0.078 -0.055** -0.069*** -0.051* 
 (0.211) (0.043) (0.009) (0.068) 
Year and industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 300 1042 909 875 
Adj R2 0.263 0.260 0.295 0.298 
 
Notes: The table presents results of the regression Model 6 where we regress the market value of the IPO firm on the first day 
of listing divided by total assets (MTA) on signed abnormal accruals, foreignness and home institutions. Column (1) presents 
regression results for Model 6 for the subsample of foreign firms. Column (2) presents regression results for Model 6 for the 
full sample. Columns (3) and (4) present regression results for Model 6 for the subsamples of US IPOs and foreign IPOs from 
strong or weak institutions, respectively. p-values based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at 
the industry level are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *,**,*** indicate significance at the two-tailed 












Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition Source 
Dependent variables  




Market value of the IPO firm at the first day of trading over total assets. Calculated by 
the offer price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after the IPO over total 
asset. It is further divided by 100. 
COMPUSTAT, 
IPO Prospectus 
PLIT The percent of firm-years with lawsuits by the country of origin of foreign IPOs as reported in A measure of private litigation as reported in Cheng et al. (2014).  
Cheng et al. 
(2014) 
SEC_ENF The percent of firm-years with SEC enforcement by the country of origin of foreign IPOs as reported in Silvers (2016).  Silvers (2016) 
US_Listing 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the IPO is in the US, or both in the US 
and home country, and set equal to 0 if the IPO has been conducted exclusively in 
firm’s foreign country.  
SDC Platinum 
Main variables of interest 
FOREIGN  An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the IPO firm is domiciled outside of the US; 0 otherwise. IPO Prospectus 
FOREIGN_STRONG_INST An interaction variable between INST and FOREIGN.  Leuz (2010), IPO Prospectus 
INST 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the IPO firm comes from a country that is 
classified by Leuz (2010) as belonging to the first cluster in Panel C of Table 3 (i.e., 
regarded as having the strongest institutions); zero otherwise. 
Leuz (2010) 
Control variables 
AGG_EM The country-level aggregated earnings management measure as calculated by Boulton et al. (2011) 
Boulton et al. 
(2011) 
AUD An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the auditing firm is a Big-6, Big-5 or Big-4 in 1990–1997, 1998–2001, and 2002 onwards, respectively; 0 otherwise. 
IPO Prospectus, 
SDC Platinum 
CFO The ratio of cash from operating activities over total assets.  IPO Prospectus, COMPUSTAT 
GDP The GDP per capita at the home country indexed to the 2005 value of US dollars. IMF database 
GDP_Avy The country average of GDP per capita based on the years in which IPOs from that country take place and indexed to the 2005 value of US dollar. IMF database 




HOME_ENF A country-specific index that scores enforcement of compliance with each country’s accounting standards as measured and presented in Brown et al. (2014).  
Brown, et al. 
(2014) 
LEV Natural logarithm of the ratio of short and long-term debt over total assets. IPO Prospectus, COMPUSTAT 
LITIG 
An indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if the firm operates in a high-litigation 
industry and 0 otherwise where high-litigation industries are industries with SIC codes 
of 2833-2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370–7374 as defined in 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003).  
SDC Platinum 
and CRSP 
LPROC Natural logarithm of 1 plus total proceeds of the offering, where the proceeds are indexed to the 2005 value of US dollars. 
IPO Prospectus, 
SDC Platinum 
LROA The lagged return on assets measured at the end of fiscal year preceding the IPO. IPO Prospectus, COMPUSTAT 




LTA Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year preceding the IPO. The value of total assets is indexed to the 2005 value of US dollars. 
IPO Prospectus, 
COMPUSTAT 
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